Two firms, App and Sam, producing a good named Smart13 compete in a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse demand equation is P=25-1½ (9,+92) The total cost function for App (the leader) is TC₁ = 191, and the total cost function for Sam (the follower) is TC2 = 3q2. Determine the leader's maximum profit. L Moving to another question will save this response. <

Two firms, App and Sam, producing a good named Smart13 compete in a Stackelberg duopoly. The inverse demand equation is P=25-1½ (9,+92) The total cost function for App (the leader) is TC₁ = 191, and the total cost function for Sam (the follower) is TC2 = 3q2. Determine the leader's maximum profit. L Moving to another question will save this response. <

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter13: best-practice Tactics: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1E

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A6 In Changlun, Kedah, there are two bakers, Abu and Bakar. Their bread taste the same and nobody can tell the difference. Abu has constant marginal costs of RM1 per loaf of bread. Bakar has constant marginal costs of RM2 per loaf. Fixed costs are zero for both of them. The inverse demand function for bread in Changlun is p(q) = 6 – 0.01(qA + qB), where q is the total number of loaves sold per day. Find the reaction function for Abu and Bakar. What is the Cournot Nash equilibrium number of loaves of bread for each baker?
Please solve it quickly you can upload handwritten answer also. Consider Atlanta as an oligopoly market with five airlines that behave in a Cournot Model fashion. The Atlanta market demand schedule is: P = 390 - .5*Q. The Cost schedule for Delta is: MC=AC=Scomp=80. The Cost schedule for the other four firms (United, Southwest, et al) is: MC=AC=Scomp=40. What is Delta’s new market share?
1. Two firms (A and B) play a competition game (i.e. Cournot) in which they can choose any Qi from 0 to ¥. The firms have the same cost functions C(Qi) = 10Qi + 0.5Qi2, and thus MCi = 10 + Qi. They face a market demand curve of P = 220 – (QA + QB). a. Assume firm A chooses quantity first. Frim B observes this choice and then chooses its own quantity. What is Frim B's profit as a function of QA and QB? b. Firm B has MRB = 220 – 2QB – QA. What is firm B’s best response to an arbitrary QA selected by firm A? c. Given that firm A expects firm B’s best response, what is firm A’s profit as a function of QA? (Hint: the only unknown variable in the profit function should be QA) d. Firm A has MRA = 150 – 4QA/3. What are the equilibrium QA and QB selected in this game? e. What is the equilibrium price, and how much profit does each firm collect?
onsider a homogenous good industry with four firms. Total demand is given by D(p)=200-p.The variable (=marginal) cost of each of the firms is c1=10, c2=20, c3=30 and c4=35. Firms compete in prices. Suppose firms 1 and 2 merge into one entity and produce with a marginal cost of 15. Which of the following statements is correct? After the merger, total welfare increases by $500. After the merger, total welfare decreases by $500. After the merger, total welfare increases by $1000. After the merger, total welfare decreases by $1000. None of the above.
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Suppose you're the manager of Babylon Jazz Bar. And, your bar has both young and adult customers. The demand for a typical adult customer is Q4 = 18– 3P and, for a typical young customers is Q' = 10 – 2P, where Q shows number of drinks and P shows price per drink. The marginal cost of a drink is 2-TL. And, you want to determine an entrance fee & a price per drink that maximize Babylon's profit. a. What will be the fees (entrance & per drink) for adult customers, and number of drinks? b. What will be the fees for young customers, and number of drinks? c. What is the profit of Babylon if there are 100 customers in each group?
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WEBCAM RECORDING Industrial Economics la 9 Suppose a duopoly where the inverse demand is given by p = 50 – 2Q with Q = q1 + q2. The cost function is TC(q;) = 10q; +72, i.e. a non fixed costs are equal to 72, for both firms. Supposing that one of the two firms acts as a Stackelberg leader, the leader's output which maximizes its data profit is: gio max: ntrassegna O (a) 12 nda O (b) 10 O (c) 9 O (d) 8 Precedente Successivo
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