Suppose that each of two firms in an oligopolistic industry has MC = 8 and together they face P = 68 %D - 2Q a) If the two firms compete in this market what are P, Q, q1, and q2? b) If the two firms collude what are P Q a1 and
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- If firm 1 and firm 2 are the oligopolistic firms in bottled spring water production in Nomansland. The market demand is given by ? = 5000 −20?, Qd is the number of kilolitres demanded per month while P is the price of kilolitres of bottled water. The marginal cost of a kilolitre of bottled water is R10.How do I Find the Cournot equilibrium quantities and price? and how do I Find the Cournot profits and the monopolist profits?Suppose that Fizzo and Pop Hop are the only two firms that sell orange soda. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: Рop Hop Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 8, 8 15, 2 Fizzo Doesn't Advertise 2, 15 11, 11 For example, the upper right cell shows that if Fizzo advertises and Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo will make a profit of $15 million, and Pop Hop will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Fizzo and Pop Hop are both profit-maximizing firms. If Fizzo decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ million if Pop Hop does not advertise. If Fizzo decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ million if Pop Hop does not advertise. If Pop Hop advertises, Fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses If Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo makes a higher…Suppose that Fizzo and Pop Hop are the only two firms that sell orange soda. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: Fizzo Advertise Doesn't Advertise Advertise 10, 10 2, 18 Pop Hop Doesn't Advertise For example, the upper right cell shows that if Fizzo advertises and Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo will make a profit of $18 million, and Pop Hop will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Fizzo and Pop Hop are both profit-maximizing firms. 18, 2 11, 11 If Fizzo decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ advertise. If Fizzo decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ advertise. If Pop Hop advertises, Fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses If Pop Hop doesn't advertise, Fizzo makes a higher profit if it chooses Both firms will choose to advertise. million if Pop Hop advertises and a profit of $ O Fizzo will choose to advertise and Pop Hop…
- . OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was founded in 1969. Their original objective was to form a cartel to increase the price that they receive for their oil exports. Create a prisoner’s dilemma type game for two large members of OPEC (e.g. Saudi Arabia and Indonesia). Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of these two countries. Verbally explain how you got your numbers. Find the Nash equilibrium. Based on this model, what strategy is in the oil exporters’ best interest (Nash or otherwise)? How do they make it happen? Create another prisoner’s dilemmamodel for all of OPEC on one side, and all non OPEC oil exporting nations on the other side. Create numbers, where payoffs are total annual oil export revenues for each of the two sides. Verbally explain how you created your numbers. Also create your numbers applying the fact that OPEC’s total production capacity is greater than total non OPEC exports…If Bean Bruuer advertises, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses If Bean Bruuer doesn't advertise, Hatte Latte makes a higher profit if it chooses Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise. Both firms choose to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise. Again, suppose that both firms start off not advertising. If the firms decide to collude, what strategies will they end up choosing? Hatte Latte will choose to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose not to advertise. Hatte Latte will choose not to advertise and Bean Bruuer will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose to advertise. Both firms will choose not to advertise.To advertise or not to advertise Suppose that Creamland and Dairy King are the only two firms that sell ice cream. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: Dairy King Advertise Doesn't Advertise Creamland Advertise 10, 10 18, 2 Doesn't Advertise 2, 18 11, 11 For example, the upper right cell shows that if Creamland advertises and Dairy King doesn't advertise, Creamland will make a profit of $18 million, and Dairy King will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Creamland and Dairy King are both profit-maximizing firms. If Creamland decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of _________ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of ________ million if Dairy King does not advertise. If Creamland decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of __________ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of _________…
- Consider a duopolistic market with two firms, A and B, facing a market demand curve of P=100-qA –qB for the same product. Assume that the cost of production is CA=2qA for firm A and CB=4qB for firm B. Suppose that both firms make output decision simultaneously. In Nash equilibrium, the firm A should produce unit, and its profit is In Nash equilibrium, the firm B should produce unit, and its profit is .Consider a Cournot duopoly. The inverse demand function of the market is given by p = 10-Q, where p is the market price, and Q = 91 +92 is the aggregate output. The marginal costs of the two firms are C₁ 1 and C₂ = 4. = (a) Solve for the Nash equilibrium of the game including firm out- puts, market price, aggregate output, and firm profits. (b) Now suppose these two firms play a 2-stage game. In stage 1, they produce capacities 9₁ and 92, which are equal to the Nash equilibrium quantities of the Cournot game characterised by part (a). In stage 2, they simultaneously decide on their prices p₁ and P2. The marginal cost for each firm to sell up to capacity is 0. It is impossible to sell more than capacity. The residual demand for 10 Piāj if Pi > Pj firm ij, is Di (Pi, Pj) = 10-Pi 2 = if pipi. (Note, if Pi < Pj 10 - Pi here we assume that the efficient/parallel rationing applies). Prove that it is a Nash equilibrium of the second stage subgame that each firm charges the market clearing…To advertise or not to advertise Suppose that Creamland and Dairy King are the only two firms that sell ice cream. The following payoff matrix shows the profit (in millions of dollars) each company will earn depending on whether or not it advertises: (base to table) For example, the upper right cell shows that if Creamland advertises and Dairy King doesn't advertise, Creamland will make a profit of $15 million, and Dairy King will make a profit of $2 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Creamland and Dairy King are both profit-maximizing firms. If Creamland decides to advertise, it will earn a profit of $_____ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of $____ million if Dairy King does not advertise. If Creamland decides not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $______ million if Dairy King advertises and a profit of $_____million if Dairy King does not advertise. If Dairy King advertises, Creamland makes a higher profit if it chooses (to…
- If firm 1 and firm 2 are the oligopolistic firms in bottled spring water production in Nomansland. The market demand is given by ? = 5000 −20?, Qd is the number of kilolitres demanded per month while P is the price of kilolitres of bottled water. If I assume in the bottled spring water production industry oligopoly exists amongst 20 firms how do I solve for the cournot quantities,prices and profits at equilibirum ? If ten firms are merged how will I calcuate the new Cournot equilibrum quantities, prices and profits for above?if two firms (firm A and firm B) are competing selling T-shirts, both at $12 per shirt, both have a quantity of 50 and both can produce a t-shirt at a cost of $2 per shirt both marginal and average. If both companies are competing directly against each other in prices, what will the new marginal price of company B will be? and what will be their profits? Also, how do you solve the equilibrium price in oligopolies?Consider a "punishment" variation of the two-firm oligopoly situation shown in the figure below. Suppose that if one firm sets a low price while the other sets a high price, then the firm setting the high price can fine the firm setting the low price. Suppose that whenever a fine is imposed, X dollars are taken from the low-price firm and given to the high-price firm. RareAir's price strategy High Low $12 $15 A B High $12 $6 $6 $8 Low $15 $8 Instructions: Enter your answer as a whole number. What is the smallest amount that the fine X can be such that both firms will want to always set the high price? $O million Uptown's price strategy