Sub-game Perfect outcome.

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.9P
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Question 3
Think of a repeated game where the following game G has been played twice. Find out the
Pareto dominant Sub-game Perfect outcome. Provide in detail about the procedures you
undertake to get the equilibrium/Equilibria. Does proposition 2 apply in the game? Explain.
C2
|(3,0)-
(3,1)
(4,4)
A2
B2
|(3,1)-
(2,1)-
|(1,2)-
(0,0)-
(1,2)-
(0,1)е
Transcribed Image Text:Question 3 Think of a repeated game where the following game G has been played twice. Find out the Pareto dominant Sub-game Perfect outcome. Provide in detail about the procedures you undertake to get the equilibrium/Equilibria. Does proposition 2 apply in the game? Explain. C2 |(3,0)- (3,1) (4,4) A2 B2 |(3,1)- (2,1)- |(1,2)- (0,0)- (1,2)- (0,1)е
Proposition 2
If G is a static game of complete information with multiple NE then there
may be a subgame perfect outcomes of the repeated game G(T) in which for
any t<T, the outcome in the stage t is not a NE of G.
Transcribed Image Text:Proposition 2 If G is a static game of complete information with multiple NE then there may be a subgame perfect outcomes of the repeated game G(T) in which for any t<T, the outcome in the stage t is not a NE of G.
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