Male antelopes (lopes) fight for the right to mate. Whenever two lopes encounter each other, they first test each other out by sparring. If they both back off, there’s an 80% chance that they will go on and mate. If they fight to the death, there’s a 40% chance for each that they will survive to mate. If one wins and the other runs off, the winner has a 100% chance of mating and the one who leaves has a 70% chance of mating. a. What are the Nash equilibria in this game? b. Which equilibria are important for the species to continue to propagate?

Male antelopes (lopes) fight for the right to mate. Whenever two lopes encounter each other, they first test each other out by sparring. If they both back off, there’s an 80% chance that they will go on and mate. If they fight to the death, there’s a 40% chance for each that they will survive to mate. If one wins and the other runs off, the winner has a 100% chance of mating and the one who leaves has a 70% chance of mating. a. What are the Nash equilibria in this game? b. Which equilibria are important for the species to continue to propagate?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter15: Strategic Games

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2MC

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