Assume that the competition between Boeing and Airbus can be characterized by the following matrix Airbus Produce Quit Produce -15/ – 5 90/0 0/0 Boeing Quit 0/140 where the first number in each cell denotes the payoff that Boeing receives and the second number is the payoff that Airbus receives. Assume that Boeing has a first mover advantage. Then a subsidy of 10 provided to Airbus by the European government will change nothing O will increase European welfare will negatívely affect European welfare O result in both firms leaving the market
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- Name: 1. Consider the following simultaneous move game: a. 2.5 4 Row Top Up Down Bottom N 16xe mszbiM Left 5,5 2,6 3,1 3,5 Column Center 8,4 10,1 5,4 9,7 Middle (6,6 2,4 3,3 4,5 Right 5,4 2,4 16 3,4 20hunini 02:hobe Use the method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies to eliminate as many strategies as possible for each player. Briefly explain your steps. (4 marks) 26 5100W sed mexa pm/ ebul b. Using the method of best responses, find the Nash Equilibrium of this game. Mark the best response on the matrix and circle the NE. Briefly explain why this is a NE. (4 marks) anatibunenk c. Consider the outcome (Bottom, Center), briefly explain why this is NOT a Nash Equilibrium. (2 marks). When Chinese automakers began exporting cars, rather thanfocusing on developed nations in the West, they shippedautos to emerging markets in countries such as Algeria, Russia,Chile, and South Africa. In these markets, even used vehiclesfrom multinational manufacturers are relatively scarce—andrelatively expensive. The Chinese automakers, who prioritizelow cost rather than design or even safety, applied a penetration-pricing strategy. A woman in Santiago, Chile, who boughta new Chery S21 explained, “The price factor is fairly decisive.I paid $5,500 new and full. Toyota with similar features costsaround $12,000.” Why do you think Chinese automakerschose that pricing strategy? Do you think it was successful?As Chinese regulators pressure these manufacturers to maketheir cars safer, do you think they will be able to keep theirprices low compared with those of the international automakers? Why or why not?26fnan421 Word Gozden Geçir Górunum Vard m e vaomak sted nz sOv eyin 1) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop either TV or Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix: FIRM Y TV LAPTOP FIRM X TV 30, 30 20, 35 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 A) What is the cooperative outcome? B) Which firm benefits most from the cooperative outcome? How much would that firm need to offer the other?
- Kate and Alice are small-town ready-mix concrete duopolints. The market demand tunction is o- 20,000 - 200Pwhere Pis the price of a cubic yard of concrete and Ois the number of cubic yards demanded per year. Marginal cost is sa0 per cubic yard. Suppose Kate onters the market first and chooses her output belore Alice. What is the difference in Alice's profit when Kata enters the market tirst, compared to when they simultanecusly select ther outputa? When Kate entors the markat first, Alice's profit is $3,888.a0 lower. O When Kate enters the market fest, Alice's profit is 513,333.33 lower. O When Kate enters the market first, Alice's profit is $5,000 lower. O When Kate onters the market first, Alice's proft is $1.111.11 higher,fnan421 WWord Gozden Geç r Gorunum Varc m Ne yaomak steci gnz soy evn 1) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop either TV or Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix: FIRM Y TV LAPTOP FIRM X TV 30, 30 50, 35 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 A) If both firms make their decisions at the same time and follow maximin (low-risk) strategies, what will the outcome be? B) Suppose both firms try to maximize profits, but Firm X has a head start in planning, and can commit first. Now what will the outcome be? What will the outcome be if Firm Y has a head start in planning and can commit first? IConsider the following price game: Firm 1 Firm 2 High Low High 20, 20 12, 24 Low 24, 12 14, 14 Remark: In simultaneous move games (games with rows and columns) theconvention is to write the row player’s payoff first and the column player’spayoff second. (a) What is the Nash equilibrium of this game? Recall that for each playeryou should find the best response to each of the opponents’ strategies andunderline the associated payoff. Then look for a cell where both strategiesare best responses to each other. This is a Nash equilibrium. (b) Does either firm have a dominate strategy (a strategy that is always abest response)?
- ం వయడు Firms in Marçaa cost =o for Goth • FicmsAroduce Fir Twe firms 20 bertrand compotition for both diffrencided poduts, oms Sunction have the fallowing inverse denand शि= | -01- 203 pz=1-92-5 a Defue repried 6 Denve Rertrand equilbba Bertrand reaction functio) and diagremadticalde 5) madirall Deుల and equilubi gauntitier,pricer Arofits.Let G be the following static zero sum game. Rose ABCD А A 4 -2 Colin B C D -4 -3 L с -1 7 5 -2 5236 7123 -2 (a) Draw the movement diagram of G. (b) Using the method of iterated elimination of dominated strategies, find the smallest subgame of G from which the solution of G can be realized. (You do not have to find the solution of the game.)fnan421 Word Gözden Geçir Görünüm Varam V Ne yapmak isted ginzi soyieyin 2) Two firms, X and Y, are planning to market their new products. Each firm can develop TV, Laptop. Market research indicates that the resulting profits to each firm for the alternative strategies are given by the following payoff matrix: FIRM Y TV LAPTOP PHONE FIRM X TV 30, 30 50, 35 20, 50 LAPTOP 40,70 20, 20 50,80 PHONE 50,20 80,50 10,10 A) Find the Nash equilibria for this game, assuming that both firms make their decisions at the same time. (explain the decision step by step)i B) If each firm is risk averse and uses a maximin strategy, what will be the resulting equilibrium? (explain the decision step by step);
- For example, the lower left cell of the matrix shows that if Full Coop advertises and Lucky Bird does not advertise, Full Coop will make a profit of $14 million, and Lucky Bird will make a profit of $3 million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Lucky Bird and Full Coop are both profit- maximizing firms. If Lucky Bird chooses to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ advertise. million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of $ million if Full Coop does not If Lucky Bird chooses not to advertise, it will earn a profit of $ not advertise. million if Full Coop advertises and a profit of $ million if Full Coop does S If Full Coop advertises, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses If Full Coop doesn't advertise, Lucky Bird makes a higher profit if it chooses Suppose that both firms start off by deciding not to advertise. If the firms act independently, what strategies will they end up choosing? Both firms will choose not to advertise. O Lucky Bird will choose not to…Next Question Consider the network scheduling profit matrix Can the Pareto Critenon hep me networks sette on a single equibrum? Explain The Pareto Criterion Ne O A cannot help the networks sette on a singlo equibrum because the Wednesday Thursday networks cannot communicate OB. can help the networks settle on a single equibrum because the networks have dominant strateges Wednesday OC. cannot help the networks settie on a singie equilbnum because no Nash equilibria is better for both networks 40 Nebok 2 O D. can help the networks settle on a single equibrium because one Nash equilibrium has the highest joint payoffs O E. cannot help the networks settle on a single equilbrum because the networks must schedule simultaneously ThursdeyWould it be wise for a brick-and-mortar retailer thatwants to stop showrooming to use wireless-jammingtechnologies to prevent people from using smartphonesinside its stores? Why or why not?